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CONSENT TO TREATMENT
By LORNE ELKIN RozovsKy"
This article attempts to deal with the legal aspects of consent to treat-
ment as they affect the daily practicalities of hospital and medical practice.
Despite the ever popular box office topics of abortion, medical mal-
practice and moment of death, "consent to treatment" remains of burning
interest to the health care industry. This is despite the fact that there are
relatively few legal suits arising in this area. Hospital administrators and
physicians are continually concerned about whether their treatment of patients
has been in their words "legal". This concern probably stems from the differ-
ing orientations of the health care industry and the legal world. Whereas the
latter focuses on the rights of individuals; the former concentrates upon the
needs of individuals as determined by its own standards. The patient is not
normally a participant in the decision-making process as regards treatment.
The rights of the patient and the needs of the patient are not always the same,
and it is the act of consenting to treatment which links the two. The health
care worker, whether he be administrator, physician or nurse knows that his
whole function is based on this exercise of the patient's rights. Needless to
say, in an industry such as the health care field where questioning and chal-
lenging on a case-to-case basis are not a part of every day life, the entire
subject matter of consent to treatment may be regarded as a threat to tradi-
tionally unquestioned authority.
The concern over consent to treatment also arises from the fact that
hospitals, as opposed to practitioners' offices, are traditionally systems orient-
ed. Efficient hospital administrators attempt to fit consent to treatment wihin
an efficient system. This is usually done through the "consent form". What
administrators, physicians and nurses fail to appreciate is the fact that the
mere signing of a form does not necessarily make the proposed treatment
"legal". They do not appreciate that the consent form is merely evidence of
the patient having consented. The manner in which the consent is obtained
may have far more bearing on whether the consent is valid than the actual
signing of a form.
There is also some feeling in the health care industry, particularly in
that branch mainly concerned with physicians, that consent to treatment
concerns the physician almost exclusively. This completely disregards the
development of the health care 'team' located in the hospital which is treat-
ing the patient. While the physician is a member of this team, many of the
personnel who are presently treating and interfering with the patient's integrity
are not physicians. With the usual exception of the physician, the hospital is
vicariously responsible for the members of the team who are its employees.
*Departmental Solicitor, Nova Scotia Hospital Insurance Commission and Presi-
dent, Nova Scotia Medical-Legal Society.
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If the American trend is followed in Canada,' the hospital may be primarily
responsible for the treatment of the patient. Consent to treatment is thus a
matter of concern for the hospital as well as for the physician alone.2
Assault and Battery
Regardless of whether these two torts are considered as one combined
tort or separately, it is clear that the effect of them is that an action arises
when one person intentionally applies force to the person or body of another
without the latter's consent or some other lawful reason. Such an action arises
no matter how trivial the touching may be, regardless of any harm that may
have been caused and regardless of whether or not the person doing the
touching was angry or hostile.3 It is clear therefore that almost everything
which a hospital employee or a physician does to a patient could constitute
assault and battery, or in common parlance, assault. It is also clear that one
of the essential elements in establishing the tort of assault is that there was
no justification for the touching or that the patient did not consent to the
touching.
From a realistic point of view, if there were no damages and the touching
of the patient was minor and part of the general treatment, it is probable
that an assault action would not be taken, or that it would be thrown out of
court as an abuse of the court's process.4
Despite the fact that lack of consent is a constituent element of the tort
of assault and battery, the matter is sometimes handled by the courts and by
plaintiffs' counsel as a negligence problem. However, it should be noted that
when lack of consent is discussed in negligence terms, it is usually described
as negligence in failing to obtain consent; either by failing to properly inform
the patient,5 negligence in failing to warn the patient of the risks involved
in the medical procedure,0 or negligence in going beyond the patient's instruc-
tions.7 The removal of more body tissue than was necessary has also been
discussed in terms of negligence rather than in terms of assault and battery
or a touching outside the consent of the patient. 8 Most Canadian cases, how-
ever, deal with the matter strictly as one of assault and battery or trespass
to the person. Consent to treatment cases usually arise as a result of the
I Darling v. Charleston Memorial Hospital (1965), 33 Ill. (2d) 326, 211 N.E.
(2d) 253.
2 See T. L. Fisher, Patient Consent Form (1971), Canadian Hospital, Vol. 48, No.
1, Jan. 1971, at 34; and L. E. Rozovsky, Consent to Investigative Operative or Treat-
ment Procedures (1972), Canadian Hospital, Vol. 49, No. 7, (luly, 1972) at 48.
3 Salmond, The Law of Torts (15th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1969) at 157;
J. G. Fleming, The Law of Torts (2nd ed. Sydney: Law Book Co. of Australasia, 1961)
at 26.
4 Burk v. S., (1951-2), 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 520 (B.C.S.C.).
I Kenny v. Lockwood, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507 (Ont. C.A.).
0 Male v. Hopmans (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 105, [1967] 2 O.R. 457 (Ont. C.A.).
Suit for negligence dismissed.
7 Boase v. Paul, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 562 (Ont. S.C.).
8 Wilson v. Swanson, [1956] S.C.R. 804; 5 D.L.R. (2d) 113 (S.C.C.).
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intentional acts of physicians or hospital employees, intention being a con-
stituent element of the tort of trespass;9 whereas negligence is unintentional.10
The distinction is important usually because of limitation periods. Most
provinces in Canada have in their medical or hospital statutes special limi-
tation periods for actions against both physicians and hospitals, as well as
employees of the latter." In some cases, the limitation may be included in
the provincial Limitation of Actions Act.'2 The categorization of the tort as
assault or as negligence is important where the limitation period is different
depending upon the categorization. Most provinces frame their special limi-
tation periods in terms of "negligence in the admission, care, treatment or
discharge of a patient" for hospitals,13 whereas Saskatchewan sets specific
limitation periods for all actions brought against hospitals.' 4 The latter would
of course include assault and battery, and therefore any concern about cate-
gorization of the tort would not be based on limitations. A similar problem
arises with respect to actions against physicians where limitations sections are
often based on "negligence or malpractice". These actions would not appear
to include a claim for assault and battery. In the case of physicians, these
sections are sometimes included under provincial medical acts and sometimes
under Limitation of Actions Acts. While there is not always a discrepancy in
the limitation period depending upon the categorization of the tort, this
possibility should be kept in mind and appropriate statutes examined.'a
The second reason for concern as to the categorization of a tort arising
from lack of consent is that to prove assault and battery no injuries are
required whereas such proof is required in any suit based on negligence.' 0
The third reason for concern over categorization concerns hospitals
only and not physicians since malpractice insurance policies of hospitals
usually cover "negligence in the administration of any medical, surgical or
9 See, supra, note 3, Salmond. Also J. J. Atrens, "International Interference with
the Person" in A. M. Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Lav (Toronto: Butterworths,
1968) at 378.
10 S. R. Speller, Lm Relating to Hospitals and Kindred Institutions (4th ed. Lon-
don: H. R. Lewis, 1965) at 98; Also Winn v. Alexander, [1940] 3 D.L.R. 778, [1940]
O.W.N. 238.
"1 Hospital Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 178, s. 36; The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A.
1970, c. 209, s. 56; The Hospital Standards Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 265, s. 14; The Public
Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 378, s. 37; Public Hospitals Act, S.N.B. 1966, c. 22, s. 17;
Public Hospitals Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 249, s. 15; The Hospitals Act, S.P.E.I. 1959,
c. 16, s. 15; The Hospital Act, S.N., 1971 no. 81, s. 37. See also limitations for actions
against physicians: The Limitation of Actions Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 209, s. 55; Medical
Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 239, s. 82 and S.B.C. 1066, c. 26, s. 48; Medical Act, R.S.M.
1970, c. M90, s 43; The Newfoundland Medical Board (Amendment) Act, S.N. 1959,
No. 11, s.2; limitation of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 2; The Medical Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 268, s. 48; The P.E.I. Medical Act, S.P.E.L 1952, c. 31, s. 31; The
Medical Profession Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 303, s. 55; Medical Profession Ordinance,
R.O.Y.T. 1958, c. 73, s. 10.
1
2 E.g. Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 168, s. 2(1) (d).
13 B.C., Alta., Ont., N.S., N.B., P.E.I., P.E.I. & Nfld.
14 The Hospital Standards Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 265, s. 14.
'5 See J. S. Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths,
1972) at 232.
16In Mulloy v. Hop Sang, [19351 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. A.D.) the injury to the
patient was not as a result of the trespass and damages were awarded per se.
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hospital treatment" which would leave the hospital uninsured for assault if
a court were to interpret the policy strictly. Such a distinction does not concern
physicians individually since most physicians in Canada are members of the
Canadian Medical Protective Association, a mutual defence association and
not an insurance company1
7
A fourth concern over categorization is that if an action is categorized as
assault and battery, medical testimony may not be permitted to illustrate
acceptable medical practice since the standard with which the procedure was
performed becomes irrelevant.'8 The fact that an operation was necessary
and that it was performed satisfactorily is no defence to an action based on
trespass to the person.19
Consent to Treatment
There is much confusion among many of the personnel of the health
care industry in relation to the distinction between consent to treatment and
the consent form. It is often not recognized by the layman that the signing
of a consent form merely evidences that the person has consented and that
the evidence could be obtained through witnesses who either heard or saw
the patient consent. Such consent may be expressed by the patient in writing
or orally or it may be implied from what the patient has said or written or
from some action he has taken. Once proven, the manner in which the patient
consented is irrelevant.2
0
While it was clear at common law that no amount of professional skill
could justify the substitution of the will of the surgeon for that of his patient 2'
and that, generally speaking, a patient was required to give his basic and
fundamental consent to the general nature of treatment to be conducted, 22
the remedy for failure to abide by this principle was strictly by way of civil
action. However, some provincial legislatures have now superimposed a statu-
tory requirement on the common law. An Ontario regulation under the Public
Hospitals Act, for instance,23 states that no surgical operation shall be per-
formed on a patient unless a consent in writing for the performance of the
operation has been signed by the patient; or, if the patient is unable to sign
by reason of mental or physical disability, the spouse, one of the next of kin
or parent of the patient; or the parent or guardian of the patient if the patient
is unmarried and under 18 years of age. Saskatchewan,24 New Brunswick25
and Quebec 20 have similar provisions. While reinforcing the common law,
17 23, 668 members in 1971 (C.M.P.A. 71st Annual Report, June, 1971).
18 See P. V. Coffey, Surgery Without Consent (1965), 29 Albany L. R. 342.
19 Mulloy v. Hop Sang, supra, note 16.
20 W. C. J. Meredith, Q.C., Malpractice Liability of Doctors and Hospitals (Toron-
to: Carswell, 1956) at 141-42; Speller, supra, note 10, at 98.
2 1 Brannan v. Parsonnet (1912), 83 N.J.L.R. 20 at 26.
22Male v. Hopmans, (1965) 54 D.L.R. (2d) 592 at 595; [1966] 1 O.R. 647 (Ont.
H.C.) aff'd by (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 105, [1967] 2 O.R. 457 (Ont. C.A.).
23 R.R.O. 1960, Reg. 523, s. 42.
24 S. Reg. 13/71, s. 51.
25 N.B. Reg. 66-47, s. 40.
26 3.2.1.8 of Reg. under Health and Social Services Act, S.Q. 1971, c. 48 from
Quebec Official Gazette, May 27, 1972.
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they also add certainty to particular vacuum areas in so far as health and
hospital workers are concerned.
Criteria for a Valid Consent
Five criteria must be met to establish a good defence to a suit for assault
and battery by a physician or hospital employee.
1. Voluntary Consent.
The patient consenting to the touching of his person must consent in a
free and voluntary manner. He must be in a position to choose between
consent and refusal without any feeling of constraint. 27 Similarly a consent
given under compulsion or duress or obtained by fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion is invalid.28 The patient must also be in a condition so as to physically
and mentally be able to consent voluntarily. A Quebec case rejected the
defence of consent where it was obtained following the giving of a sedative
and was given in words of defeat, exhaustion and abandonment of willpower.29
2. Informed Consent.
Unlike decisions of American courts which have attempted to define
very strict, subjective or objective tests with regard to informing a patient,30
Canadian courts seem to have described the duty to inform the patient in
much more general terms - that is to be honest in fact and to express an
honest belief. The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that the surgeon, in in-
forming the patient, should not be judged as if he had warranted a perfect
cure nor be found derelict in his duty on any meticulous criticism of his
language.31 There is no necessity for a physician to explain in detail the
actual medical techniques being used as long as the nature of the treatment
is fully understood.82 However, Canadian courts seem to lean towards the
subjective test in that the information given to the patient depends upon the
condition and the mentality of that particular patient. For instance, the
Ontario Court of Appeal, in dealing with lack of consent as a negligence
matter, held that it was not negligent to fail to warn a patient of a grave
possibility of hearing loss where, owing to the condition of the patient, the
physician could not have hoped to make clear the bewildering alternatives
to the treatment and the patient could not have made any intelligent choice
at all.83 In that case, the risk of hearing loss was 20 to 30%. In an earlier
2 7 Bowater v. Rowley Regis Corp., [1944] K.B. 476; also Latter v. Braddell (1881),
5 L.J.Q.B. 448.
28 See, supra, note 20 at 142.
29 Beausoleil v. Soeurs de la Chariti (1964), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 65, [1965] Que.
Q.B. 37.
30 M. Oppenheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment (1962), 65 Clev. Mar.
L. Rev. 249.
3 1 Kenny v. Lockwood, supra, note 5.
3 2 Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital, [1971] 2 O.R. 103 (Ont. S.C.).
33 See supra, note 22 in the Court of Appeal.
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case, the same Court held that it was not necessary to disclose to a patient
before an operation those dangers which are inseparable from any operation
such as death under an anaesthetic, the danger of infection, of tetanus, of
gas gangrene or gangrene.34 It has also been recognized that to inform the
patient to too great an extent may in fact be detrimental to the patient's
condition.35
3. Consent to Act Performed.
While on the one hand the patient must give his fundamental consent
to the general nature of the treatment,36 on the other hand the consent must
not be so general as to be meaningless.37 The touching of the body or the
medical or surgical treatment proposed must relate as closely as possible to
that which the person has consented to. The courts have stayed away from
very specific consents requiring a detailed informing of the patient and a
corresponding detailed consent to same. 8
The major problem in this area is the extent to which the surgeon can
go within the realm of the consent given. It is clear that an operation cannot
be performed which is different from that which is consented to.39 The British
Columbia Supreme Court awarded a plaintiff $3,000 for the tying of her
fallopian tubes during a cesarean section, which was performed with the
consent of the plaintiff. The Court found that while it was certainly advisable
to tie the tubes, an emergency did not exist and therefore it was not necessary
to take such a step at that time. The law is clear that an operation without
consent on the basis of convenience is not acceptable.
40
On the other hand, the courts have gone quite far in extending the scope
of consent in order to allow for the physician's exercise of judgment. For
example, the Quebec Superior Court dismissed an action brought against a
physician who had removed a patient's ovaries without consent. No negligence
was alleged, and the physician did not decide to remove the ovaries until he
had begun an appendectomy operation. Since the consent was for an opera-
tion which would put an end to the patient's troubles, consent to the removal
of the ovaries was implied.
41
The same Court in dealing with the same problem nine years later found
for the defendant on the basis that he had done what was proper to remove
the complaint of which the patient had complained. She had consented to an
operation to remove this complaint. An additional factor was that her ovaries
were already sterile.42 Both these cases relied heavily on Common Law deci-
3 4 Kenny v. Lockwood, supra, note 5.
35 See supra, note 22 in the Court of Appeal.
80 See supra, note 22 in the High Court.
37 See supra, note 10 at 99.
38 Johnston v. Wellesley Hospital, supra, note 32.
39 See Valdez v, Percy, 38 Cal. Ap. (2d) 485.
40 Murray v. McMurchy, [1949] 1 W.W.R. 989; [1949] 2 D.L.R. 442.
41 Caron v. Gagnon (1930), 68 C.S. 155.
42 E. v. M. (1939), 77 C.S. 298.
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sions. An early Manitoba case dealt with lack of consent as a negligence
problem. There a physician who was employed to remove a tumor also
removed the womb, the ovaries and the fallopian tubes. The action was dis-
missed on the basis that it was good medical practice to do this especially since
the ovaries and the fallopian tubes were useless once the womb had been
removed. Furthermore, because the action was brought on the grounds of
negligence, the patient was unable to show that her condition was as a result
of the alleged negligence.43
In certain cases, the patient has made a very specific request to the
physician to carry out a certain procedure. Any deviation from this procedure
can result in liability.
In the famous Mulloy v. Hop Sang case,4 the physician was employed
to temporarily repair an injured hand and not to amputate it. The physician
amputated and was found liable for trespass. In an earlier decision, the
Ontario Supreme Court found a dentist liable for extracting 12 teeth instead
of the one requested by the patient. Again, while the claim was based on
assault and battery, the Court considered it as a negligence problem.45
In another Quebec case, it was decided that the physician could change
techniques without getting the patient's permission to do so. In Lafreniere
v. Hopital Maisonneuve,46 the Court, relying on an earlier British Columbia
Supreme Court decision,47 held that it was permissible for the physician to
give a general anaesthetic rather than to continue to give locals. As the only
master of his work, he would have been at fault in not giving anaesthesia
regardless of the type. This may appear to be in conflict with the Beausoleil
case4s but there, the patient expressly forbad the giving of a spinal anaesthetic.
The instructions were very specific and were reversed only after the patient
was sedated.
As a result of these decisions, it has become the practice to request
patients to consent to additional or alternative operative measures that may
be found either necessary or immediately necessary.49 While this recognizes
that the operation or procedure might be extended, it does not allow for a
completely different operation to take place, something which would not have
been even remotely contemplated by the patient.
4. Consent to a Particular Person Touching.
When a person consents to being touched (a touching which without
such consent would be assault) there is an implication that the consent is
also to a particular person doing the touching. As a result, it has also become
43 Bennett v. C. (1907-8), 7 W.L.R. 740 (Man.).
44 [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. A.D.).
45 Boase v. Paul, supra, note 7.
46 [1963] Que. C.S. 467.
47 Burk v. S., supra, note 4.
48 Beausoleil v. Soeurs de la Charite, supra, note 29.
49 See supra, note 20 at 148. Also supra, note 2 and Consent to Treatment (Lon-
don: Medical Defence Union, 1968) at 10.
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common practice to have patients recognize that no assurance has been given
that an operation will be performed by a particular surgeon.50 While such a
clause certainly assists in avoiding problems, the Ontario High Court in
Villeneuve v. Sisters of St. JosephR1 held that the authority given to one
physician to do an operation gave that physician implied authority to engage
another to do the anaesthesia. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs, as
intelligent persons, could not have been unaware that the operation involved
anaesthetic and that this would be given by someone other than the physician
initially employed. A similar situation arose in British Columbia where the
Court concluded that it would not be reasonable to expect the physician
employed to do the anaesthetic and the operation.
52
5. The Patient Must be Capable of Consenting.
Basically only adults have the legal capacity to consent to treatment.
While this capacity arose traditionally at age 21, various provinces have altered
this age by changing the age of majority or by enacting specific provisions as
outlined above implying that capacity arises at a lesser age. Once a person
has reached adulthood, that person and only that person has the power to
consent to a touching of his own body. While this has been modified slightly
by legislation as noted above, consent or authorization taken from other
persons does not replace the necessity for consent from the patient. If a
patient is not mentally capable of consenting for one reason or another, and
he is not in an emergency state, nor under guardianship, in the absence of
legislation, there is no person who can stand in his place for the purposes of
consent.
The traditional view that persons who have not reached their majority
do not ordinarily have the legal capacity to consent unless they have been
specifically given such capacity by legislation was liberalized somewhat by
the Ontario Court of King's Bench in the 1910 case, Booth v. Toronto
General Hospitalo3 in which a 19 year old though "not of the highest inteffi-
gence" consented to an operation. The Court stated that while he had not
reached his majority he was capable of taking care of himself and of doing
a man's work and therefore it was not necessary to consult his parents. The
recognition that minors can be capable of consenting at law when they are
emancipated from their parents causes certain practical difficulties for hospi-
tal personnel, particularly at the lower administrative levels, since decisions
to operate in necessary but non-emergency cases must usually be made in a
very limited space of time and often under a certain amount of stress. The
lack of precise guidelines and of legislation specifically lowering the age limit
causes much uncertainty. Admitting clerks cannot truly be expected to carry
out investigations as to whether or not a child is emancipated, especially in
cases where the parents cannot be found. A more difficult problem arises with
patients under psychiatric care. Many people equate mental illness with a
50 See supra, note 49.
51 [1971] 2 O.R. 593.
52 Burk v. S., supra, note 4.
53 Booth v. Toronto General Hospital (1910), 17 O.W.R. 118.
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lack of capability. This is neither true in law nor in psychiatry. Canadian
mental health legislation by and large creates a vacuum in the matter of con-
sent to treatment, especially where the patient in a psychiatric hospital must
be transferred to a general hospital for non-emergency treatment and where
such person has not been declared legally incompetent.
Public trustees are not usually given power over the person of a patient
but over his estate only. Thus consent cannot be given by this official. Simi-
larly mental health legislation usually does not give the director or adminis-
trator of a mental hospital the power of guardianship over the person of his
patients. Guardianship proceedings, especially for relatively minor medical
matters, are costly and time consuming, and this gap in Canadian mental
health legislation should be filled. Until that time however, consent is often
obtained from relatives or from hospital administrators - not as a substitute
for the consent of the patient but to estop the relatives from taking action
against the hospital and the physician. Given the attitude of the Canadian
courts in the area of consent to treatment, one wonders whether a court would
in fact be very sympathetic to a suit for assault and battery where hospital
and medical officials have acted reasonably and fairly and for the benefit of
the patient.
Other groups which concern health care workers are married men and
women, prisoners, the blind, the deaf, the illiterate and non-English speaking
persons. While the rights of a husband over his wife's body (or vice versa)
can be disputed at length and are beyond the scope of this article, one must
recognize that there is no requirement at Common Law for consent from a
patient's spouse. However it is advisable, particularly in the area of sexual
relations and reproductive capabilities, to obtain consent on the ground that
such an operation would affect the non-patient spouse's marital rights. Such
a procedure requires the consent of the spouse not as a substitute for that of
the patient but in addition to it.15 It should be noted that consent must be
obtained from prisoners unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary.
Without such authority even a court cannot order a procedure as simple as a
medical examination of a prisoner without his consent.55
The blind, the deaf, the illiterate and non-English speaking patients cause
certain problems simply because of the difficulty of informing these patients
of what they are consenting to and the reliance by many health institutions on
written forms, without making provision for consent to be obtained in a
manner conducive to the capabilities of the patient. Hospitals and physicians
should make provisions to obtain consent in a way that allows such patients
the full exercise of their rights.
Forbidden Touching
The mere fact that a person requires medical attention does not give the
health care workers confronting him the right to treat him over his objections.
No consent can be implied from his condition, and once it has been proven
that he has specifically refused to give consent, there is no defence to a suit
54 See discussion in Best v. Samuel Fox and Co. Ltd., [1954] 2 All E.R. 394.
55 Agnew v. Johnson, 13 Cox C.C. 625.
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for assault. Such was the case in MuIloy v. Hop Sang. 6 The patient in that
case specifically told the physician that his hand was not to be amputated.
The physician said that he would be governed by the conditions found when
the anaesthetic had been administered, and he assumed that by not receiving
an answer from the patient he could proceed as he pleased. Because the
patient was a foreigner, the Court found that he did not understand what the
physician had said and that if he had, since he already had given specific
instructions, he would have refused. Thus the Court would not imply consent
from his failure to answer the physician's remark. The Beausoleil case57 was
also a case of forbidden touching. Such cases usually arise with Jehovah
Witness patients since their refusal to accept blood transfusions brings them
into direct confrontation with the orientation and mentality of the health care
industry. 8
Emergencies
The one major exception in which consent to treatment is not required
is in the case of an emergency. An emergency may arise on the initial con-
tact with the patient or during treatment of the patient. To proceed without
consent, it must be shown that it was not possible to obtain the patient's
consent (assuming him to be an adult and of sound mind) and that the pro-
cedure was immediately necessary to preserve the health and life of the
patient.59 It is not enough that it would be better or more convenient to
proceed with a particular procedure at the time. It must be necessary to
proceed at the time without consent.60
Experiments
The usual principles of consent apply to experimental medical proce-
dures. However, because the risk may be far greater and because in many
cases there is no benefit to the patient, the patient must be informed to a
much greater degree than he would ordinarily. The possibility of an adverse
psychological reaction is no excuse for not doing this. In Halushka v. Univer-
sity of Saskatchewan,,1 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the duty
to inform is as great if not greater than in ordinary medical cases and that
there can be no exceptions as in ordinary medical practice. The researcher
does not have to balance the probable effect of lack of treatment with the
effect of the information on the patient. Furthermore, the Court stated that
the undisclosed or unrepresented facts need not concern matters which directly
cause the ultimate damage if they are of a nature which might influence the
judgment upon which the consent is based.
50 [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. A.D.).
67 (1964), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 65, [1965] Que. Q.B. 37.
58 L. E. Rozovsky, Blood (Part I): lehovah Witnesses & The Law, Canadian Hospi-
tal, Mar. 1971.
G9 Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R. 261 (N.S.S.C.).
0o Mulloy v. Hop Sang, supra, note 16.
61 (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 436.
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The Consent Form
Hospitals, physicians and nurses are constantly asking when the law
requires them to use a consent form. Since it is the consent which is required
and not the signed form, the simple answer would be never except where
provincial legislation requires it. It must be explained to them that the consent
form commonly used in hospitals and by physicians is merely evidence that
the patient has consented and that in itself it is not foolproof. If the form in
which it is written or the manner in which it is signed or the circumstances under
which it is signed are not in conformity with the facts or with the legal require-
ments of the particular situation, it can be overthrown.
Despite the fact that one need not prove damages in assault and battery
cases, it is more likely that a patient will sue on grounds of assault and
battery, perhaps in addition to negligence, where injury has in fact occurred.
Since written evidence collected at the time of the event is usually more
reliable than the memory of a witness, it would be best to obtain such written
evidence in cases which carry a greater risk of injury to the patient. In all
other cases the patient is less likely to sue, or if he were to sue without having
suffered damages, the courts would probably regard it as an abuse of the
court's process or award only nominal damages, especially where the hospital
and physicians have acted fairly and reasonably. These are the legal risks
which must be outlined by the solicitor to his hospital or medical clients. The
extent of the protection desired is strictly an administrative and medical
decision. Needless to say, the best protection would be to have a consent form
signed in cases of all touchings of all patients. Considering the practical
effects however, the operations of the hospital would grind to a halt.
Conclusion
While it is clear that Canadian courts have accepted the right of the
patient to refuse treatment and have balanced this right with the desirable
goal of the health care industry to care for the needs of a patient, there is
often considerable disturbance when a patient does exercise his rights to
refuse treatment. Mr. Justice Knowles speaking in the Saskatchewan Court of
King's Bench in 19292 expressed his frustration over a patient who had
refused to consent to a necessary operation and was, as a result, experienc-
ing an agonizing wait for death.
His Lordship said:
Three months ago the medical men knew this would all happen, but according to
our present legislation, or lack of legislation, they were helpless. The poor immi-
grant, through ignorance or foolhardiness, or both, forbade them putting forth
the hand which would have saved his life. Should not society protect such a
man from his own foolishness?
62 Masny v. Carter-Halls-Aldinger Co. Ltd., [1929] 3 W.W.R. 741 at 745.
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